Joint response to request for comment on the SEC Concept Release Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) & Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) (June 5, 2000)
Jonathan
G. Katz
Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, DCÿ
20549-0609
Dear Mr.
Katz:
This
letter is in response to the request for
comment on the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Concept Release,
"International Accounting Standards,"
File No. S7-04-00 (the Concept Release).ÿ
We commend the SEC for its ongoing
efforts to uphold the quality of financial
reporting domestically while encouraging the
development of a high-quality global
financial reporting framework, and we
appreciate the opportunity to respond to the
Concept Release.ÿ
The
views expressed in this letter are supported
jointly by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) and the Trustees of
the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF).
Because the FAF does not involve itself in
standard-setting matters of a technical
nature, this jointly issued letter expresses
the FAF's and FASB's views only on
nontechnical matters. The FASB is providing
a separate comment letter that includes a
more comprehensive response to other issues
and to individual questions posed in the
Concept Release. Although that comment
letter reaches a conclusion about the
conditions for acceptance of IASC standards
similar to the conclusion in this letter,
the FAF is not commenting on any views
expressed in the FASB's separate comment
letter.
The FAF
and FASB are committed to the objective of
increasing international comparability while
maintaining the highest quality accounting
standards in the United States.ÿ
Our position on that topic is set
forth in a report, International
Accounting Standard Setting: A Vision for
the Future, issued jointly by the FAF
and the FASB (the FAF-FASB Vision report).
ÿThere is a strong and
growing demand for high-quality,
internationally comparable financial
information that capital providers find
useful for decision making in global public
capital markets.ÿ
Ideally, that demand would be
satisfied by use of a single set of
high-quality accounting standards for both
domestic and cross-border financial
reporting.ÿ
The FASB continues to work with the
International Accounting Standards Committee
(IASC) and with other standard setters in an
effort to converge national and
international standards while improving the
quality of financial reporting worldwide.ÿ
Our comments reflect our commitment
to the objective and goals in the FAF-FASB
Vision report.
Introduction
The
Concept Release seeks input to determine
under what conditions the SEC should accept
in U.S. markets financial statements of
foreign private issuers (foreign issuers)
that are prepared based on standards
promulgated by the IASC. We acknowledge that
the IASC has made significant improvements
to many of its standards as a result of its core standards project and that an increasing number of countries
and international organizations have
expressed support for use of the IASC core
standards for cross-border filings. We also
appreciate the salience of the SEC's
consideration of the IASC core standards.ÿ The SEC's conclusions about the conditions for acceptance
of those standards may affect, for example:
1.ÿÿÿÿÿ
The extent to which those standards
are used worldwide
2.ÿÿÿÿÿ
The extent to which an appropriate
infrastructure will develop to support their
use
3.ÿÿÿÿÿ
The nature of the restructured
IASC's agenda priorities
4.ÿÿÿÿÿ
The future agenda priorities of other
standard setters that are working with the
IASC to converge national and international
standards to achieve the highest quality
international solutions.
There
seems to be an unfortunate perception on the
part of some that the future of the IASC as
an organization is in some way contingent
upon the SEC's conclusions about the
acceptability of the core standards in their
current form
for use without reconciliation by
foreign issuers listing in the United
States. Regardless of the SEC's
conclusions, we believe that more widespread
use of IASC standards outside U.S. markets
is desirable and that the IASC, once
restructured, will play an increasingly
important role in the evolving global
financial reporting infrastructure. As we
have publicly stated on many occasions, we
support the restructuring of the IASC and
believe the IASC will help in leading
efforts to converge national and
international accounting standards. Further,
there will continue to be a prominent role
for the IASC as emerging-market countries
look to IASC standards as a basis for
developing their own standards and as member
states of the European Union increasingly
consider IASC standards for use in European
capital markets. The success of the
restructured IASC will be vital to the continued development of a single set of high-quality
international accounting standards and to
the successful evolution of a high-quality
global financial reporting infrastructure.ÿ
Although
the future of the IASC is bright,
conclusions about the acceptability of the
IASC's core standards for use in U.S.
markets must be reached in the present, amid
a number of competing national and
international perspectives and in an
environment in which the elements of a
global financial reporting framework are in
various stages of development.ÿÿÿ
The SEC's decision, while it may
weigh heavily outside of the United States,
must ultimately be in the best interests of
U.S. investors participating in U.S.
markets-consistent with the SEC's
mandate to protect U.S. investors.ÿ
Such a decision should be one that
benefits U.S. investors by increasing their
ability to compare investment opportunities
and to make informed investment decisions.
Joint Conclusions of the
FAF and the FASB
The
Concept Release poses four alternatives to
the level of acceptance of IASC standards,
three of which would require elimination of
some or all of the current requirements for
foreign issuers using IASC standards to
reconcile their financial statements to U.S.
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).ÿ
Our conclusion about the
acceptability of IASC standards for use by
foreign issuers in U.S. markets is that the
current reconciliation requirements should
be maintained, not eliminated.ÿ
The factors we considered most
significant in arriving at that conclusion
are:
úÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
Convergence.ÿ
As stated in the FAF-FASB Vision
report, we are committed to (1) ensuring
that international accounting standards are
of the highest quality and (2) accelerating
convergence of national and international
standards to achieve the highest quality
international solutions. The IASC shares a
similar commitment.ÿ
Current reconciliation requirements
provide a focal point for the efforts of the
IASC and the FASB
and a mechanism for measuring
progress toward meeting the goals of
high quality and convergence.ÿ
Removing the requirement that
foreign issuers using
IASC standardsÿ
provide a reconciliation to U.S. GAAP
could impede those efforts by removing a
powerful incentive to work together toward
greater comparability.ÿ
úÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
Comparability.ÿ
Regardless of the relative
quality of the two sets of standards, there
are differences between IASC standards and
U.S. GAAP and there are variations in the
way IASC standards are applied around the
world.ÿ
Current reconciliation requirements
are intended to help create comparability
among foreign issuers using different
accounting standards and comparability between foreign issuers that do not use U.S. GAAP as a basis for
their financial reports and domestic issuers
that use U.S. GAAP.ÿ
We believe that a continued
reconciliation requirement will assist in
creating comparability and will reduce costs
that would arise if reconciliation were
abandoned.
úÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
The
SEC's enforcement role. The early stage
of development of a high-quality global
financial reporting infrastructure (in
particular the lack of a global enforcement
mechanism for IASC standards) places a great
deal of pressure on the SEC's enforcement
role of ensuring comparability and
transparency of financial information
reported in the United States by foreign
issuers using IASC standards. The pressure
on the SEC to relax its enforcement role
would increase if instead of requiring
reconciliation, the SEC allowed variations
in the way IASC standards are presently
interpreted and applied outside the United
States to influence its enforcement
decisions.ÿ
In contrast, failure to accede to
these variations may ultimately place the
SEC in the awkward position of establishing
a "U.S.-only" version of IASC
standards.
Each of
those factors can ultimately lead to
increased costs to financial statement
users-that is, U.S. investors-attempting
to compare the investment opportunities
available in U.S. markets.ÿ Those factors are discussed in more detail below.
Convergence
It would
be ironic if, in an attempt to accelerate
the widespread use of IASC standards, their
acceptance without reconciliation in the
United States actually became an impediment
to the process of converging national and
international standards.ÿÿ
For a number of reasons we are
concerned that eliminating the requirements
for foreign issuers to reconcile IASC
standards to U.S. GAAP could potentially
hinder the ability of national standard
setters (like the FASB) and the IASC to
converge their standards.ÿ
The following concerns would arise ifÿ
the SEC decided to relax the current
reconciliation requirements for foreign
issuers that use IASC standards-whether
that conclusion extended to one or more
standards (or aspects thereof) assessed on
an individual basis or to the entire set of
core standards assessed as a whole. In
particular:
úÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
Absence
of a reconciliation requirement can
eliminate an important source for
identifying and prioritizing areas on which
to focus convergence efforts. Both the
IASC and the FASB support the objective of
developing a single set of high-quality
global accounting standards. In the United
States, reconciling items tend to arise from
differences between the results that are
reported based on the standards used by
foreign issuers to prepare their financial
statements and the results that would have
been reported if the financial statements
had been prepared based on U.S. GAAP.ÿ
A requirement to reconcile helps to
identify the primary areas of
noncomparability on which national and
international standard setters need to focus
their convergence efforts in order to
achieve the highest quality international
solutions.
úÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
Absence
of a reconciliation requirement can reduce
incentives for the FASB and the IASC to
converge their standards. One of the
greatest perceived benefits of using a
single set of accounting standards worldwide
is the concurrent increase in the quality
and the comparability of financial
reporting.ÿ When two sets of standards are not comparable and there is no
requirement to reconcile, the motivation to
converge those standards to achieve a single
high-quality international solution is
likely to be reduced.ÿ
Further, without a reconciliation
requirement, important information about the
quality of one solution relative to another
may be lost or obscured. Reconciliation
provides a means not only for identifying
areas on which to focus convergence efforts,
but also for identifying areas in which
there are variances in the application or
interpretation of standards, that is, areas
in which the quality of standards
potentially could be improved. In
conjunction with the intensifying demand for
a single set of high-quality global
accounting standards, the reconciliation
requirement provides a strong incentive for
both the IASC and the FASB continually to
evaluate the quality of their respective
standards in their efforts to eliminate
differences.
úÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
Absence
of a reconciliation requirement can make it
more difficult to measure the progress of
convergence efforts. A reconciliation
requirement is a source that can be used in
monitoring and evaluating the success of
convergence efforts.ÿ
To the extent that convergence
efforts are successful, there will be a
natural decline in the amount and type of
reconciling items that prevail when IASC
standards are reconciled to U.S. GAAP.ÿ
If convergence efforts are not
successful, reconciling items may continue
or new reconciling items may emerge.ÿ
If the
SEC removes reconciliation requirements at
this stage, before national standard setters
and the IASC have had the opportunity to
converge their standards, we fear that a
significant motivation for convergence
efforts would disappear and that achieving
the goal of a single set of high-quality
international standards will be pushed even
farther into the future.ÿ
The failure of the IASC to actively
pursue convergence could lead to less
support for the restructured IASC and could
jeopardize the chances for its success in
developing a high-quality global financial
reporting infrastructure.
Comparability
Current
SEC requirements permit use of IASC
standards by foreign issuers as an
alternative to using their home country
standards in preparing their primary
financial statements, provided that an
audited reconciliation to U.S. GAAP also is
prepared. The present reconciliation
requirements provide U.S. investors with a
basis for making comparisons among entities
regardless of the accounting standards used
in preparing the primary financial
statements. A lack of
comparability-whether it relates to
comparing the financial statements of two
IASC-based foreign issuers or to comparing
IASC-based financial statements to U.S. GAAP-based
financial statements-increases the costs
and uncertainties related to making informed
investment decisions.ÿ
In particular:
úÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
Absence
of a reconciliation requirement can increase
costs to U.S. investors even if IASC
standards and U.S. GAAP are judged to be of
equivalent quality.ÿ
International comparability is cited
by many as a primary benefit to be gained by
using a set of international accounting
standards.ÿ
Ideally, the unreconciled financial
statements of a foreign issuer prepared
based on IASC standards would be of
equivalent quality with those of other
foreign issuers using IASC standards and
with the financial statements of foreign and
domestic issuers reconciling to or using
U.S. GAAP. However, even if the two sets of
accounting standards were of equal quality,
there would be differences between them that
would create costs in comparing those
financial statements.
úÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
Absence
of a reconciliation requirement shifts the
costs of producing comparable financial
information from the preparers of that
information to the users of that information
and creates uncertainty.ÿ
Without reconciliation, the burden of
producing comparable information will fall
on a group of users (that is, U.S.
investors, creditors, and others) that will
have to expend resources in order to make
the data comparable.ÿ
Additionally, differences between
reported financial results for essentially
similar transactions and events creates
uncertainty about the relevance,
reliability, and representational
faithfulness of those results.
Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP helps to create
comparability between foreign and domestic
issuers, which minimizes the costs to
investors of comparing investment
alternatives and making informed investment
decisions and reduces uncertainty.ÿ
Comparability
issues will remain until there is worldwide
use of a single set of high-quality
international accounting standards.ÿ
As the restructured IASC and national
standard setters work together to converge
standards and develop high-quality
international solutions, comparability will
naturally increase and investors will reap
benefits as they arise, without bearing the
costs that would be introduced by
eliminating current reconciliation
requirements.
The SEC's Enforcement
Role
In the
FAF-FASB Vision report, we identified a
number of elements that would be necessary
to support an international accounting
system in the future.ÿ
Those elements are similar to many of
the elements identified in the Concept
Release as necessary to a high-quality
global financial reporting infrastructure.
We continue to believe that in order for a
set of high-quality international accounting
standards to be used successfully worldwide
and the maximum benefits of their use to be
comprehensively realized those standards
must be supported by an adequate global
financial reporting infrastructure.
We
observe that many of the various elements of
a global financial reporting infrastructure
are still in the early stages of development
or do not yet exist. In that situation, a
conclusion must be reached about the
acceptability of IASC-based financial
statements for U.S. markets in terms of the
current U.S. financial reporting
infrastructure. That is, the SEC will
necessarily have to evaluate whether methods
and means are available in the various
nations to ensure the appropriate
application and enforcement of IASC
standards.ÿ
The current lack of enforcement
mechanisms in other countries places burdens
on the SEC to provide the means of ensuring
that IASC standards are properly applied.
We
recognize that the SEC has some jurisdiction
through its review and comment process to
regulate interpretation and application of
IASC standards outside the United States
when financial statements are prepared by
foreign issuers for consumption in U.S.
markets. The role that the SEC plays in
enforcing accounting standards to ensure
comparability and transparency is more
proactive than the roles of market
regulators in many countries-that is part
of the reason that there are variations in
the way that IASC standards are presently
being interpreted and applied worldwide. To
the extent that those circumstances
continue, and in the absence of a global
enforcement mechanism for IASC standards, we
believe that the SEC likely will find itself
filling the gap created by the lack of a
global enforcement mechanism for IASC
standards. That is, by virtue of maintaining
its significant interpretive and enforcement
role for U.S. markets, the SEC staff will
have a significant impact on how IASC
standards are interpreted and applied
worldwide.ÿ
That
situation seems inevitable whether or not
the current reconciliation requirements
continue.ÿ
However, we believe that eliminating
the requirements for foreign issuers to
reconcile to U.S. GAAP for some or all of
the IASC's core standards would exacerbate
that situation. Many IASC standards include
implicit and explicit alternatives or
provide only general implementation
guidance.ÿ
As such, in the absence of
reconciliation, the SEC staff would find
itself in the position of deciding on a
case-by-case basis which accounting methods
in IASC standards are acceptable for
financial reporting in the United States-a
role that would place it in the position of
creating standards on an ad hoc basis.ÿ
We do not believe the SEC should be
an ad hoc standard setter.ÿ
Although the SEC has the legislative
authority to assume the role of standard
setter, its historical position has been to
look to the private-sector to develop and
interpret standards through extensive and
open due process.
If the
lack of reconciliation significantly
increases the SEC's interpretive role
through its enforcement responsibility,
ultimately its interpretations could
interfere with the development of a sound,
independent international accounting
standard-setting process and with the
convergence of national and international
standards.ÿ
That result could come about if the
SEC were to approach acceptance of
unreconciled IASC standards on a
case-by-case basis; that is, an approach
that focuses on the acceptability of an
accounting standard in the context of a
filed financial statement.
A
case-by-case approach would carry additional
difficulties.ÿ
If the SEC were to accept IASC
standards without reconciliation and then
interpret and accept IASC standards used in
a filed document, that acceptance could
relate only to the present standard and any
applicable interpretations that existed at
the time the SEC reached conclusions
regarding the document.ÿ The SEC would then be enforcing those standards and
interpretations and resolving issues related
to alternatives and ambiguities in terms of
what the SEC currently found acceptable for
foreign issuers listing in the United
States.ÿ
That approach might place the
restructured IASC in a difficult position as
it attempts both to improve the quality of
its standards and to facilitate the
convergence of national and international
accounting standards toward the highest
quality international solutions. There is
the possibility that the IASC would be
disinclined to choose to amend or interpret
a standard in a way that varies from what
has been deemed acceptable for purposes of
filing in the United States-even if a
different solution would increase the
quality and international comparability of
reported financial information.
A
case-by-case approach could also increase
the danger that there would be two (or more)
versions of IASC standards-those that are
acceptable to the SEC and those that are
acceptable in markets outside the United
States.ÿ
To the extent that the SEC's
interpretation and enforcement of
unreconciled IASC standards predominated,
the SEC would, in effect, become a global
standard setter.
Continued
reconciliation requirements would allow the
restructured IASC to maintain flexibility to
interpret and amend its standards without
potentially being influenced by the
possibility that a particular solution would
change a standard's status as acceptable
without reconciliation in the United States.
The Overall Objective of
the FAF and the FASB
We
strongly support the efforts to develop a
single set of high-quality accounting
standards to be used worldwide within our
overall objective of increasing
international comparability while
maintaining the highest quality accounting
standards in the United States. There is
much work left to be done in achieving that
objective, including work on converging
national and international standards and
work on developing an adequate financial
reporting infrastructure to support their
use.ÿ Consequently,
we conclude that at this time, elimination
ofÿ the
current requirements for foreign issuers
using IASC standards to reconcile to U.S.
GAAP would not move us closer to our goals.
In
particular, the results of that conclusion
would conflict in some respects with the FAF
and the FASB's overall objective.ÿ
For example, if the SEC concluded
that an individual IASC standard was of a
quality equal or superior to its U.S. GAAP
counterpart but that standard differed from
its U.S. GAAP counterpart, eliminating the
requirement for a foreign issuer using that
standard to reconcile to U.S. GAAP would
decrease the comparability of financial
information provided to U.S. investors.
Decreased comparability would increase costs
to those investors.
We also
find it problematic to consider the use of
IASC standards by foreign issuers in U.S.
markets in the absence of key elements of a
global financial reporting infrastructure.ÿ
In that situation, there is no ideal
solution.ÿ We note that even if the entire set of core standards were
accepted without reconciliation, some
reconciliation to U.S. GAAP still would be
necessary in those cases in which an IASC
standard did not address a particular type
of transaction, for example, for specialized
industry transactions.ÿ
Thus, even if the decision were
reached to eliminate reconciliation
requirements for the IASC's core
standards, some reconciliation would
continue to be required for at least some
foreign issuers that use IASC standards.ÿ
Closing Remarks
We
reiterate our support for the IASC's past
and future efforts to improve the quality of
international accounting standards.ÿ
Those standards are only one element
of a global financial reporting
infrastructure.ÿ
Other elements of the global
financial reporting infrastructure are not
yet sufficiently developed to be relied upon
for the rigorous interpretation and
application of the IASC's core standards.ÿ
Thus, the SEC will necessarily have
to rely on the methods and means available
within its own jurisdiction with regard to
application and enforcement of the core
standards, primarily the significant
interpretive and enforcement role of the SEC
staff.ÿ
Maintaining current reconciliation
requirements can help to avoid some of the
possible implications stemming from the
SEC's enforcement role on the future
development of international accounting
standards and on the convergence of national
and international accounting standards.ÿ The current reconciliation requirements facilitate
convergence of standards and help to
maintain comparability between foreign and
domestic issuers.
Those
observations are based on the current status
of the various elements identified by the
SEC as necessary to a high-quality global
financial reporting framework and the need
for the SEC to continue to carry out its
mandate of investor protection. The
restructured IASC will be better positioned
than its predecessor to lead the convergence
of national and international accounting
standards and to achieve high-quality
international solutions that increase both
the quality and the comparability of
financial reporting worldwide.ÿ
The success of the restructured IASC
would be jeopardized if it did not focus on
convergence or if its process of
interpreting or amending standards was
influenced by the SEC's acceptance of
unreconciled accounting standards in U.S.
markets.ÿ
That outcome, which we are concerned
could result from eliminating current
reconciliation requirements, would impede
the ability of national standard setters and
the IASC to ensure that international
accounting standards are of the highest
possible quality and to accelerate
convergence of national and international
accounting standards.
At the
present time, we believe that there is only
one conclusion that we can support as an
optimal solution to the issues raised in the
Concept Release-the SEC should continue to
require that foreign issuers that use IASC
standards in preparing their primary
financial statements also provide full
reconciliation to U.S. GAAP. That conclusion
is consistent with our vision for
international accounting standard setting,
in which the ideal outcome is worldwide use
of a single set of high-quality accounting
standards for both domestic and cross-border
financial reporting.ÿ
Continued progress toward that
outcome will result from pursuing the
overall objective of increasing
international comparability while
maintaining the highest quality accounting
standards in the United States. In the
meantime, reconciliation would help to
minimize costs to financial statement users
by helping to create comparability between
investment alternatives presented based on
different accounting standards.ÿ
We hope
that our comments are helpful. We would be
pleased to discuss any aspects of our
comments at your convenience.
Sincerely,
ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
ÿ
Edmund
Jenkinsÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
Manuel Johnson ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
Chairmanÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
Chairman and President
Financial
Accounting Standards Boardÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
Financial Accounting Foundation
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